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Note
The Problem with Waste: Delaware’s Lenient
Treatment of Waste Claims at the Demand Stage
of Derivative Litigation
Jamie L. Kastler∗
In 2006, Citigroup was the United States’ largest financial
institution.1 Its assets were worth $244 billion,2 its share price
hovered around $54,3 and it employed over 332,000 people.4
Then the subprime mortgage crisis began.5 Starting in 2007,
Citigroup posted significant losses in consecutive quarters due,
in large part, to its investments in subprime mortgage-backed
debt.6 By November 2008 Citigroup was worth only $20.5 billion, its once significant share price settled at a measly $3.77,
and it had lost around 75,000 employees.7
In November 2007 while the financial crisis decimated Citigroup, its chief executive officer (CEO) and chair of the board
of directors, Charles Prince, resigned.8 Despite Prince reigning
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2004,
Carleton College. The author thanks the Board and Staff of the Minnesota
Law Review, notably Kristina Rode and Laura Arneson, for their diligent work
and helpful suggestions. The author also thanks Professor Brett McDonnell for
his insightful comments and ideas. In addition, the author thanks his parents
and brothers, Jason and Benjamin, for their unconditional support and encouragement. Copyright © 2011 by Jamie L. Kastler.
1. Cf. Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk:
Bank Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 22348662.
2. See id. at A34.
3. See James Doran, “Everything on Table” in Citigroup Crisis Talks,
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/
nov/21/citigroup-banking.
4. Fortune Global 500 2007: Citigroup, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn
.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2007/snapshots/2927.html (last visited Apr.
10, 2011).
5. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 1.
6. See Doran, supra note 3.
7. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 1.
8. See Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Robert E. Rubin to Serve as Chairman of the Board of Citi; Sir Win Bischoff to Serve as Acting Chief Executive
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over Citigroup during a time when the corporation lost billions
of dollars, Citigroup’s board of directors granted him the substantial resignation package of “a $10 million bonus, $28 million in unvested stock options and $1.5 million in yearly
perks.”9 Given Citigroup’s decline and the timing and size of
the departing CEO’s golden parachute, it is not surprising that
some of Citigroup’s stockholders wanted to hold the members of
its board of directors, who are the statutorily designated managers of the corporation,10 personally liable for the corporation’s
disastrous change of circumstances.11
Citigroup is incorporated in Delaware.12 Under Delaware
corporate law, members of a board of directors owe fiduciary
duties to their corporation and its shareholders.13 One method
for shareholders to bring a lawsuit against a board of directors
for a breach of these fiduciary duties is through shareholder derivative litigation, meaning that the shareholders sue the directors on behalf of the corporation.14 Delaware corporate law does
not, however, make it easy to hold directors personally liable
for breaches of their fiduciary duties.15 One of the protections
against personal liability for directors of Delaware corporations
is an exculpation clause in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation.16 Exculpation clauses protect directors from liability
for their business decisions on behalf of the corporation, except
for, among other things, acts that violate their fiduciary duty of
Officer; Charles Prince Elects to Retire from Citi (Nov. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2007/071104a.htm.
9. See Brian Wingfield, Puzzling Pay Packages, FORBES, Mar. 7, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/03/07/congress-executive-compensation-lead-comp
-cx_bw_0307ceopay.html.
10. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
11. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111
(Del. Ch. 2009) (providing background on the shareholder action against Citigroup directors and officers).
12. See id. at 112. This Note focuses on Delaware corporate law, as most
major corporations are incorporated in that state. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783,
787 (1994).
13. See, e.g., In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 114 n.6.
14. See, e.g., id. at 111 (noting that the action in question was brought by
shareholders “on behalf of Citigroup Inc.”).
15. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (acknowledging that directors are generally not responsible for corporate losses).
16. See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 695–96 (2d ed. 2008); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (providing for exculpation clauses in Delaware corporation law).
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loyalty, are not in good faith, or “involve intentional misconduct
or a knowing violation of law.”17 If a plaintiff does not successfully plead one of these exceptions to the coverage of an exculpation clause against directors shielded by such a clause, Delaware courts dismiss the case.18
In February 2009 the Delaware Court of Chancery decided
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, a derivative suit by Citigroup stockholders against, amongst others, directors of the corporation.19 The only claim that survived the
defendants’ motion to dismiss was that the directors committed
corporate waste by approving the resignation package for
Charles Prince.20 Given that Citigroup’s certificate of incorporation contains an exculpation clause,21 the survival of the
waste claim suggests that waste is now a part of the obligation
of good faith.22 If true, then a successfully pled waste claim will
allow shareholders to hold directors personally liable for any
business decisions that constitute waste, even if they are protected by an exculpation clause.23
This Note argues that the Delaware courts should explicitly place waste under the obligation of good faith. Part I describes fiduciary duties and shareholder derivative litigation
under Delaware corporate law. Part II examines the evolving
procedural placement of waste within the Delaware fiduciary
duty framework and the factual requirements for waste to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand. Part III
suggests that waste should be placed under the duty of good
faith, but that a uniform heightened factual requirement is necessary to prevent the Delaware courts from infringing upon the
power of directors to manage their corporations. This Note concludes that directors who commit corporate waste should not be
17. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 –25 (citing tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)).
18. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 503–07 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(dismissing a complaint for failing to allege facts sufficient to support a claim
that, among other things, a corporation’s officers and directors breached their
duty of good faith by failing to adequately oversee the preparation of financial
statements).
19. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 111, 139–40.
20. See id. at 111–12, 139–40.
21. See id. at 124.
22. See id. at 139 n.113 (“‘The Delaware Supreme Court has implicitly
held that committing waste is an act of bad faith.’” (quoting In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27, 75
(Del. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (noting the obligations that directors and officers cannot evade via exculpation clauses).
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afforded the protections granted by their corporation’s section
102(b)(7) exculpation clause. Additionally, the Delaware courts
should uniformly apply a particularized factual requirement to
waste claims at the demand stage of litigation to ensure that
only worthwhile claims reach discovery.
I. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
UNDER DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
Under Delaware corporate law, members of the board of directors of a corporation are protected from many types of liability flowing from their business decisions.24 While the directors
are bound by numerous fiduciary duties, only some are viable
bases for liability available to shareholders who desire to bring
suits against individual directors.25 This Part describes the protections granted to directors under Delaware corporate law, the
fiduciary duties that bind the directors, and a prominent mechanism for shareholders to pursue litigation against directors.
A. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The directors of a Delaware corporation are protected by
the judicially created business judgment rule.26 This rule operates as a presumption that, in making business decisions, the
board of directors acts “on an informed basis, in good faith,”
and with the best interests of the corporation in mind.27 The rationale for the business judgment rule is that boards of directors are granted the authority to manage the corporation under
Delaware law.28 As such, the courts, which are considered ill

24. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1772 (2007) (“[T]he business judgment rule . . . shields corporate managers from judicial scrutiny of
their decisions.”); see also In re Walt Disney (Disney V ), 906 A.2d at 52 (describing the presumptions undergirding the business judgment rule).
25. See tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (providing for exculpation clauses that eliminate
the liability of directors for violations of their duty of care).
26. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on
other grounds, Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
27. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV.
83, 87–88 (2004) (arguing in favor of viewing the business judgment rule as an
abstention doctrine).
28. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (citing DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974)).
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equipped to second-guess the substantive business decisions of
the board, should generally defer to their judgment.29
In order for plaintiffs to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule, they must show that the directordefendants violated one of their fiduciary duties.30 If plaintiffs
succeed in demonstrating such a violation, the directordefendants can only avoid liability by demonstrating that the
transaction in question was “entirely fair” to the corporation.31
If, however, the plaintiffs fail to rebut the presumption, then
Delaware courts will invoke the business judgment rule and
rule in favor of the director-defendants.32
B. DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Directors of Delaware corporations are bound by a series of
fiduciary duties. Any violation of their duty of loyalty or care, or
a transaction that constitutes waste, is a basis of liability to
hold the offending directors personally liable.
1. Directors’ Duty of Loyalty
Directors of Delaware corporations are under a duty of
loyalty to their company.33 The traditional aspect of the duty of
loyalty obliges directors to avoid transactions that involve a financial conflict of interest.34 Directors violate this duty if they
act for their own benefit in a transaction that is not “substantively fair to the corporation.”35 If the conflict-of-interest transaction is not ratified by fully informed directors or shareholders,36 the transaction will be subject to the “entire fairness”
analysis.37 This analysis has two prongs: fair dealing and fair
29. See, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780
(Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that the policy behind the business judgment rule provides “good reasons to minimize . . . substantive review”).
30. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)
(stating that the business judgment rule may be rebutted by a showing that
the directors violated their fiduciary duties or made a decision primarily to
“perpetuate themselves in office”).
31. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993).
32. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 958–59; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
33. 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW, at GCL-IV-27 (5th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011).
34. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334,
1345 (Del. 1987); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
35. 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 33, at GCL-IV-29.
36. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001 & Supp. 2010).
37. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I ), 731 A.2d
342, 367 (Del. Ch. 1998). But see Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties
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price.38 The fair dealing prong requires the court to analyze the
process under which the directors made the decision to approve
the transaction.39 Under the fair price prong, the court analyzes
whether the transaction was substantively fair to the corporation.40 It is only if the conflict of interest transaction satisfies
the “entire fairness” test that the directors avoid liability for a
breach of their duty of loyalty.41
Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court expanded the duty
of loyalty to include the duty of good faith.42 Good faith was
previously considered one part of a “triad” of fiduciary duties,
on par with the duties of loyalty and care.43 In Stone ex rel.
AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the duty of good faith is not a separate basis for
personal liability, but, instead, is a part of the duty of loyalty.44
As such, a violation of the duty of good faith creates personal
liability for directors under the duty of loyalty.45
The exact contours of the duty of good faith are anything
but clear. In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (Disney
V ), the Delaware Supreme Court established that an “intentional dereliction of duty” or a “conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” constitutes bad faith.46 The court was clear,
however, that this definition was not exclusive of what would
Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1242–43 (2010) (discussing some financial conflict-of-interest transactions that are not subject to
the “entire fairness” test).
38. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., id. at 710–11. The “entire fairness” test is not an evaluation
between two completely “bifurcated” factors, but rather “[a]ll aspects of the
issue must be examined as a whole.” Id.
42. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006). The duty of good faith was not the only basis for liability added to the
duty of loyalty since the early 1980s. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (introducing the standard
to be applied when a board attempts to sell the corporation); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 –55 (Del. 1985) (introducing a different
standard for when a board attempts to prevent a hostile takeover); Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (addressing the situation
where the directors decide whether to pursue derivative litigation).
43. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
44. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
45. See id.
46. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 62 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27, 62–67
(Del. 2006)).
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constitute bad faith.47 Thus, while the Delaware courts provided some notion of what constitutes bad faith, the full extent
of the doctrine remains vague.48
2. Directors’ Duty of Care and Section 102(b)(7) Exculpation
Clauses
Directors of Delaware corporations are also bound by the
fiduciary duty of care.49 The most prominent duty of care case
is Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the Delaware Supreme Court
held the director-defendants liable for a violation of their duty
of care for inadequately informing themselves during the procedure to sell the corporation.50 Van Gorkom established that
directors violate their duty of care if they are “grossly negligent” in making a decision.51 In Van Gorkom and subsequent
duty of care cases, the Delaware courts’ duty of care analysis
focused on the board’s decisionmaking process, rather than the
substantive decisions of the directors.52
Following the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van
Gorkom, liability insurance for directors rose dramatically in
price, and many feared that qualified directors would avoid
membership on boards due to the increased potential for incurring personal liability.53 The Delaware state legislature responded to this situation by adding section 102(b)(7) exculpa-

47. See id. at 67 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d
at 755–56). The Stone court also included a Caremark failure to institute monitoring and reporting systems, or to “act in the face of a known duty to act,”
under the bad faith rubric. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (citing Guttman v. Huang,
823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)). See generally In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (introducing the Caremark
fiduciary standard).
48. Cf. Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business
Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty,
66 MD. L. REV. 398, 421–32 (2007) (stating that “[i]n light of the confusion that
has surrounded the duty of good faith, Disney V [sic] creates a degree of clarity,” but the decision “fails to discuss the appropriate standard of review”).
49. See, e.g., 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 33, at GCL-IV-25.
50. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
51. See id. at 874.
52. See 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 33, at GCL-IV-25 to -27. Delaware
courts rejected subsequent challenges to the substantive decisions of directors
under the duty of care analysis. See, e.g., Grover v. Simmons (In re Sea-Land
Corp. S’holders Litig.), 642 A.2d 792, 807 (Del. Ch. 1993); Jedwab v. MGM
Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 600 (Del. Ch. 1986).
53. See 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 33, at GCL-I-28.
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tion clauses to Delaware’s corporate law.54 If a corporation includes such a clause in its certificate of incorporation, the directors of the corporation are indemnified from personal financial
liability for many violations of their fiduciary duties, including
any breach of their duty of care.55 Directors protected by an exculpation clause are not, however, protected from liability arising from, among other things, a breach of their duty of loyalty,
or “acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.”56
The emergence of section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses limits the mechanisms whereby shareholders can hold directors
personally liable for their business decisions.57 As exculpation
clauses indemnify directors for a violation of their duty of care,
Delaware courts dismiss any due care claims against protected
directors.58 To survive such a dismissal, the plaintiffs must
properly allege that the director-defendants had a conflict of interest in the challenged transaction or acted in bad faith.59 If
the plaintiffs succeed in showing either of these, the directordefendants will lose both the protection of the business judgment rule and indemnification from the corporation’s section
102(b)(7) exculpation clause.60 As most Delaware corporations
now have section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses in their certificates,61 plaintiffs who wish to hold directors personally liable
for their business decisions must find ways to properly allege a
violation of the duty of loyalty, including bad faith, to survive
the director-defendants’ motion to dismiss.62 While a violation
54. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 24, at 1772.
55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010).
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (noting
that “Delaware courts have consistently held” that exculpation clauses protect
directors against due care claims). A claim that is not solely based upon the
duty of care, on the other hand, is not subject to dismissal due to the presence
of a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause in the corporation’s certificate. See
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001).
59. See, e.g., In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 178–79
(Del. Ch. 2005) (“[An exculpation clause] does not provide protection against
claims based on . . . acts or omissions not in good faith and violations of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty.”).
60. Cf. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 24, at 1773.
61. Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 519, 564 (2009).
62. See Gold, supra note 48, at 432–33 (“An allegation of bad faith may be
the sole route to director liability in many instances of corporate litigation, assuming directors do not have a conflict of interest.”).
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of the duty of loyalty is now clearly a viable claim for plaintiffs
to hold directors liable, the question remains as to the types of
loyalty claims available to shareholders to bring suit against
directors.
3. The Waste Standard
Directors of Delaware corporations are under an obligation
not to waste corporate assets.63 Plaintiffs meet the waste standard if they demonstrate that the director-defendants authorized
an exchange that was “so one sided that no business person of
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation
has received adequate consideration.”64 A Delaware court will
only find waste in the “rare, ‘unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.’”65
This exacting standard is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to meet.66 If the shareholder-plaintiffs succeed in demonstrating waste, the business judgment rule will no longer protect the
director-defendants.67

63. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591–92 (1933); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663–64 (Del. 1952); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d
602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
64. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)). For a claim of corporate waste to survive a motion
to dismiss, the complaint must allege “facts showing the corporation received
no consideration, or that a transfer of corporate assets served no corporate
purpose.” Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs.,
Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ. A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *17 (Del. Ch. Aug.
24, 2004). See generally Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 (“‘If . . . there is any substantial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith
judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there
should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex post
that the transaction was unreasonably risky.’” (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein,
699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997))).
65. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 74 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263).
66. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. Ch.
1996) (describing waste as “theoretical”); Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No.
13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (“But rarest of all—and
indeed, like Nessie, possibly non-existent—would be the case of disinterested
business people making non-fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the
legal standard of waste!”). But see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 (“[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that a properly framed complaint [alleging waste] could
pass muster.”); Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92 A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Ch.
1952) (holding that a salary decision by directors was a gift of corporate funds
“amounting to waste”). See generally Velasco, supra note 37, at 1235 (“[Waste
is] the most deferential standard of all.”).
67. Cf., e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A
board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its
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The difficulty of proving waste is a reflection of the pervasiveness of the business judgment rule and its tenet that, absent allegations of fraud or conflict of interest, Delaware courts
will not second-guess the substantive decisions of boards.68
Waste is the exception to this rule and forces the court to analyze the substantive decision of the defendants.69 The waste exception, therefore, functions as a means to “police[] the outer
boundaries” of the discretion granted to a board of directors
under Delaware corporate law.70 It is not entirely clear where
waste falls within the Delaware fiduciary duty doctrinal
framework.
C. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
Shareholders who wish to bring suit against directors of a
corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties will typically pursue a derivative action.71 Shareholder derivative litigation is
equivalent to the shareholder-plaintiff compelling the corporation to sue the director-defendants for harm done to the corporation.72 As the corporation is technically the plaintiff, any recovery gained through derivative litigation goes to the
corporation, rather than to the shareholder-plaintiffs.73 The
shareholder-plaintiffs benefit through both their share in the
corporation and, more importantly, the grant of attorneys’ fees
decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.”).
68. Steiner, 1995 WL 441999, at *5; see also Jaclyn J. Janssen, In re Walt
Disney Company Derivative Litigation: Why Stockholders Should Not Put Too
Much Faith in the Duty of Good Faith to Enhance Director Accountability,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 1573, 1597 (“[C]ourts are reluctant to undertake a substantive review of director decisions.”).
69. See Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1051–52.
70. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007).
71. See Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 403 (Del. Ch. 1996). To pursue
derivative litigation, the plaintiffs must be shareholders in the corporation.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2001). Some claims, including corporate
waste, may only be brought in derivative actions. Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus.,
Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 353 (Del. 1988) (holding that any claim of waste “is entirely
derivative in nature”). Shareholders may also bring direct suits against directors for many claims, but this approach is frequently undesirable due to standing requirements, see Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del.
Ch. 1985) (citing Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 777 (Del.
Ch. 1967)), and the small relative benefit for each shareholder in bringing a
direct suit, see Bird, 681 A.2d at 402–03.
72. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036
(Del. 2004).
73. Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1124 (Del. 1988).
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if the litigation is successful.74 The downside of these attorneys’
fees is that some plaintiffs and lawyers will bring frivolous lawsuits against directors to gain the fees.75
To ensure that only worthwhile derivative suits reach trial
and to protect the deference granted to directors of Delaware
corporations to manage their company, the Delaware courts
utilize the demand requirement.76 Under the demand requirement, shareholders of a corporation who wish for the corporation to bring suit against its directors have two options.77 First,
they may ask the board of directors to sue the directordefendants.78 This is problematic, in that the board is not likely
to sue its own members.79 Additionally, the courts will defer to
the board’s business judgment in refusing the plaintiff’s demand.80
The second option for shareholders is to forego demand and
claim demand futility.81 If shareholder-plaintiffs do not bring
74. See Bird, 681 A.2d at 403.
75. See William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton Lord III, Towards a Relaxed
Summary Judgment Standard for the Delaware Court of Chancery: A New
Weapon Against “Strike” Suits, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 925 (1990); Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 55, 65 (1991) (arguing that attorneys are the primary beneficiaries of
derivative suits); Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from
Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351 (2001) (“Shareholders seldom profit—suits
are filed because their attorneys stand to reap substantial fees.”). But see Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749–50 (2004) (arguing that most derivative suits are not strike suits).
76. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984), overruled on
other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); cf. Jones v. Taylor,
348 A.2d 188, 191 (Del. Ch. 1975) (describing the shareholder-standing requirement, enumerated in title 8, section 327 of the Delaware Code, as an additional method to eliminate strike suits).
77. See Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730
(Del. 1988).
78. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1(a) (“[Complaints in derivative actions must]
allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority.”).
79. See George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 96,
139 (1980).
80. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981)
(“[W]hen stockholders, after making demand and having their suit rejected,
attack the board’s decision as improper, the board’s decision falls under the
‘business judgment’ rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule
are met.”).
81. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1(a) (stating that complaints in derivative actions, after listing any efforts made to compel directors to take action, must

1910

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1899

demand, the director-defendants can, and usually will, bring a
motion to dismiss for failure to make demand pursuant to Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1.82 To avoid dismissal of the
derivative suit, the shareholder-plaintiffs must satisfy the test
used in Aronson v. Lewis, which requires that they allege “with
particularity”83 facts that raise a reasonable doubt that either a
majority of “the directors are disinterested and independent,”
or “the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment.”84 The court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but it accepts as true
only well-pled factual allegations that do not include conclusory
statements.85 The ability of the shareholders to prove one of
these Aronson prongs is limited, as they do not have the luxury
of full discovery.86
If the shareholder-plaintiffs fail to prove one of the Aronson
prongs, the court will rule that demand was not futile and the
shareholders must make demand on the board before they can
bring a derivative action against the directors.87 If, however,
the shareholder-plaintiffs survive the motion to dismiss for
failure to make demand, the director-defendants are more likely to settle to avoid further litigation88 and the risk that the
shareholder-plaintiffs will gain additional support for their

give the plaintiff ’s reasons for “failure to obtain the action” or “not making the
effort”).
82. See Thomas P. Kinney, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility Where the Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 177
(1994). See generally Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del.
1996) (“Delaware courts have recognized that the standard to be used to evaluate a Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) motion is less stringent than the standard applied when evaluating whether a pre-suit demand has been excused in a
stockholder derivative suit filed pursuant to Chancery Rule 23.1.”).
83. DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1.
84. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
85. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254.
86. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 208–10 (Del. 1991). At the
demand stage, shareholder-plaintiffs are limited to section 220 discovery,
which permits them to check the books and records of the corporation. Beam
ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1056 (Del. 2004).
87. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (construing DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1).
88. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1054 (Del. Ch.
1996). But see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981)
(describing the role of special litigation committees, which may be used to
dismiss derivative actions before or after demand is excused).
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claims once they have access to full discovery.89 As such, demand futility is often the main battleground in shareholder derivative litigation.90
In their attempt to hold director-defendants personally liable through derivative suits, shareholder-plaintiffs need to pursue claims that allege a violation of fiduciary duties that Delaware courts will not dismiss pursuant to section 102(b)(7)
clauses. If waste falls under the duty of loyalty, it will serve as
a viable means to avoid dismissal due to the protection of exculpation clauses.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE WASTE DOCTRINE
The Delaware courts did not officially rule on whether
waste falls under the duty of care (exculpable) or the duty of
loyalty (nonexculpable). If, as recent cases indicate, waste falls
under the duty of loyalty through the duty of good faith, the
question becomes how difficult it is for shareholder-plaintiffs’
waste claims to survive the director-defendants’ 23.1 motion to
dismiss for failure to make demand. Surprisingly, in spite of
supposedly stringent pleading requirements, some Delaware
courts permitted waste claims to survive past 23.1 motions
with little factual support.91 Thus, waste serves as a viable vehicle for shareholder-plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to make demand and reach discovery, as well as a
better settlement position. This Part describes the Delaware
courts’ procedural treatment of waste and the level of factual
support courts required for waste claims to survive the demand
stage of derivative litigation.
A. THE PROCEDURAL PLACEMENT OF WASTE IN THE DELAWARE
FIDUCIARY DUTY FRAMEWORK
While the Delaware courts clearly stated that waste and
good faith are connected, the Delaware Supreme Court failed to
explicitly address the doctrinal placement of waste. This avoidance leaves open the question of whether directors protected by

89. Cf. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1056 (noting the limitations on discovery during
the demand futility stage of litigation).
90. See, e.g., Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1054 –55 (discussing the factors that
cause few derivative suits to reach trial).
91. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 901–02
(Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing the policy of permitting waste claims to survive the
demand stage with little support).
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section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses are liable for waste
claims.
Until 2001, the Delaware Court of Chancery provided conflicting opinions regarding the role of waste in the Delaware fiduciary duty framework.92 For example, in Emerald Partners v.
Berlin, the court of chancery strongly indicated that waste was
a part of good faith.93 The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the
director-defendants committed waste by approving a transfer of
assets to another director for little or no compensation to the
corporation.94 The court ruled that, if the director-defendants
committed waste, section 102(b)(7) “would not protect them
from personal liability because they would have acted in bad
faith.”95 Thus, Emerald Partners indicates that waste falls under the duty of good faith.
Despite the ruling in Emerald Partners, the court of chancery continued to disagree about the doctrinal placement of
waste. In Green v. Phillips, the plaintiffs alleged that the director-defendants committed waste by approving a salary for a
former director in exchange for an agreement not to compete or
divulge the company’s confidential secrets.96 The court of chancery dismissed the waste claim, holding that a showing of
waste did not implicate the duty of good faith and the directors
were protected from a waste claim by their corporation’s section
102(b)(7) clause.97 The court distinguished the court of chancery’s decision in Emerald Partners by stating that “the waste
claim alleged there did bring the directors’ loyalty and good
faith into question.”98 Thus, the Green decision indicates that
some, but not all, claims of waste will implicate bad faith.
In White v. Panic, the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed the topic of waste, but failed to provide clarity on
92. Cf. John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of
Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a
Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 112 & n.3, 117–18 (2004) (comparing the treatment of Delaware courts in permitting section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses to protect directors from claims of waste).
93. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, Civ. A. No. 9700, 1993 WL 545409, at *8
(Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1993).
94. See id. at *1–2.
95. Id. at *8.
96. Green v. Phillips, Civil Action No. 14436, 1996 WL 342093, at *2 (Del.
Ch. June 19, 1996).
97. See id. at *6–7.
98. Id. at *7.
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waste’s procedural placement.99 In comparing waste and good
faith, the White court stated that both standards are “similar”
in that each requires a “reasonableness” determination—
whether no reasonable person would make the decision.100 This
opinion indicates that, rather than waste showing bad faith,
good faith and waste may be roughly synonymous.101 Additionally, the court avoided the issue of whether a corporation’s section 102(b)(7) clause would bar liability for waste, thereby continuing the ambiguity regarding the placement of waste within
Delaware’s fiduciary duty framework.102
The court of chancery nonetheless interpreted the White
decision as indicating that waste is a part of the duty of good
faith. In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (Disney
IV ), the court of chancery stated that White provided an implicit recognition that waste falls under the duty of good faith.103
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the waste
issue, but curiously failed to address the court of chancery’s
reference to the doctrinal placement of waste.104 Subsequently,
the court of chancery continued to interpret White as implicitly
providing that waste falls under the duty of good faith.105 Indeed, in the court of chancery’s recent Citigroup decision,
Chancellor Chandler cited the Disney IV opinion as justification to avoid dismissal of the plaintiff’s waste claim, despite the
presence of a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause.106 Nonetheless, the Citigroup court used skeptical language, indicating
that the issue regarding the procedural placement of waste is
still not definitively settled.107
99. White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001).
100. See id.
101. In Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme Court maintained that the
methods to prove waste and good faith are similar. See 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del.
2000) (“Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it
may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith . . . .”).
102. See White, 783 A.2d at 555 n.43 (“Because the Court of Chancery did
not discuss the effect of this provision in this case and because our conclusion
obviates the need to reach this issue, we do not address it here.”).
103. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693, 749
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006) (“The Delaware Supreme
Court has implicitly held that committing waste is an act of bad faith. It is not
necessarily true, however, that every act of bad faith by a director constitutes
waste.” (citing White, 783 A.2d at 553–55)).
104. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 73–75 (Del. 2006).
105. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139
n.113 (Del. Ch. 2009).
106. See id. (citing Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 749).
107. See id. (“I am also not convinced that defendants would be exculpated
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The court of chancery decisions in Disney IV and Citigroup
indicate that waste is a part of the duty of good faith, which
means that directors are not protected from waste claims by
their corporations’ section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses. Despite the significance of the placement of waste under good
faith, the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to explicitly address
the court of chancery’s interpretation of its decision in White.
The continued avoidance by the Delaware Supreme Court of
the doctrinal position of waste is unfortunate, given the implications of the Disney IV and Citigroup decisions for the protections of directors under section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses.
B. THE ABILITY OF PLAINTIFFS ALLEGING WASTE TO SUCCEED
IN DEMONSTRATING DEMAND FUTILITY
If waste falls under the duty of good faith and is, therefore,
not an exculpable claim, the question becomes how difficult it is
for plaintiffs alleging waste to survive motions to dismiss for
failure to make demand. Despite the steep factual requirements of the Aronson test and the difficulty in succeeding with
a waste claim at trial, the Delaware courts are often lenient in
the facts required for a waste claim to survive the demand
stage of derivative litigation.108
A plaintiff who seeks to avoid making demand on the board
must demonstrate demand futility under the Aronson test.109
The first prong of the Aronson test mandates that the plaintiff
must create a “reasonable doubt” that a majority of the board is
not “disinterested and independent.”110 A plaintiff who brings a
waste claim will attempt to satisfy the second prong and create
a “reasonable doubt” that “the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”111
Both prongs require that the plaintiff make particularized factual allegations to demonstrate demand futility.112
The Delaware courts are strict in the level of factual allegations required to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to

under Citigroup’s certificate for committing waste.” (emphasis added)).
108. See, e.g., Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (Del. Ch. 2008).
109. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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make demand under the first prong of the Aronson test.113 Delaware courts found that many potential indications that directors have a stake in a transaction are insufficient to demonstrate that they are not “disinterested and independent.”114
Despite the high level of factual support required for a
plaintiff to survive under the first prong of the Aronson test,
the Delaware courts demonstrated inconsistency in the facts
necessary for a claim of waste to bypass demand under the
second Aronson prong.115 Many Delaware courts are hesitant to
dismiss claims of waste, as they are fact-specific allegations.116
This approach permits plaintiffs who claim waste to survive to
discovery, even if the claim is “barely supported by the
record.”117
Examples illustrate the ease with which some waste claims
survive demand. In Emerald Partners, the shareholderplaintiffs supported their allegation of waste by noting that auditor reports showing a transfer of corporate assets did not note
any return compensation for the corporation.118 Despite the
contention of the defendants that this omission did not mean
there was no return compensation, the court of chancery drew
113. See, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1057 (Del. 2004).
114. Under the first prong of the Aronson test, “it is not enough to charge
that a director was nominated by or elected at the behest of those controlling
the outcome of a corporate election.” 473 A.2d at 816. Additionally, it is insufficient to only allege domination or control. Id. Instead, the plaintiff must “allege particularized facts manifesting ‘a direction of corporate conduct in such a
way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the corporation (or persons)
doing the controlling’.” Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123
(Del. Ch. 1971)).
115. Cf. Reed & Neiderman, supra note 92, at 117 (“Delaware cases involving the effect of a § 102(b)(7) charter provision on allegations of waste have
held that some, but not all, claims for monetary damages based on a theory of
waste may be subject to dismissal in light of an exculpatory provision.”).
116. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979) (“Claims
of gift or waste of corporate assets are seldom subject to disposition by summary judgment . . . .”); Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240, 243 (Del. Ch. 1954)
(stating that the determination of a gift of corporate assets is “largely a question of fact”). But see Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 902
(Del. Ch. 1999) (criticizing the policy of permitting waste claims past the
summary judgment stage of litigation); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327,
338–39 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that some claims of waste may be dismissed
before discovery).
117. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 27 (Del. Ch. 1982); see also Harbor
Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d at 902 (“[Waste] claims with no genuine likelihood of
success can make it to discovery and perhaps to trial.”).
118. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, Civ. A. No. 97000, 1993 WL 545409, at *6
(Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1993).
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the inference in favor of the plaintiffs and denied the directordefendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to make demand.119
Thus, the court did not require the shareholder-plaintiffs to allege particularized facts demonstrating a lack of compensation,
but, instead, was willing to construe the omission in the auditor
reports in favor of the plaintiffs.120
In Weiss v. Swanson, the plaintiff alleged that the directordefendants committed waste by granting themselves stock options without a valid corporate purpose, but the plaintiff failed
to provide evidence indicating the lack of purpose.121 Even
though the court recognized the steep hurdle plaintiffs must
meet to succeed on waste claims at trial, Vice Chancellor Lamb
was remarkably lenient with the level of deference granted to
the plaintiff’s waste claim.122 Indeed, the vice chancellor permitted the waste claim to survive the motion to dismiss for
failure to make demand because he could not “conclude that
there is no reasonably conceivable set of facts under which
[plaintiff] could prove a claim of waste.”123 Thus, the court did
not require particularized facts demonstrating that there was
no corporate purpose behind the stock options.
Additionally, the recent decision of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in Citigroup illustrates the leniency afforded to
plaintiffs who assert demand futility under the second prong of
the Aronson test. In Citigroup, the plaintiffs alleged that the
board committed waste in the level of compensation granted to
the departing CEO, Prince.124 The court of chancery denied the
director-defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to make demand despite the plaintiffs’ failure to provide particularized
factual allegations with regard to the amount that Prince was
given, or the value of compensation afforded to the corporation.125 The court’s decision to allow the waste claim to proceed
to discovery without these facts illustrates the ease with which
some claims of waste may survive rule 23.1 motions to dismiss.

119. Id. at *6–7.
120. See id. at *6.
121. Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (Del. Ch. 2008).
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
125. Id. (“I am left with very little information regarding (1) how much additional compensation Prince actually received as a result of the letter agreement and (2) the real value, if any, of the various promises given by Prince.”).
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These examples show that Delaware courts do not always
require particularized factual allegations to permit a claim of
waste to survive demand under the second Aronson prong. This
low factual requirement is poorly chosen, considering that
waste is theoretically the most deferential standard for director-defendants.126
Not all waste claims survive the defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to make demand.127 Claims of waste failed
due to procedural mistakes,128 or a poorly crafted complaint.129
Additionally, some Delaware decisions employed a heightened
requirement of particularized factual allegations that was similar to those required under the first prong of the Aronson
test.130 Finally, Delaware courts also dismissed claims of waste
on the vague grounds that the complaint made conclusory allegations.131 Nonetheless, the dismissal of waste claims by some
courts merely indicates that the Delaware courts differ in the
level of factual allegations required for a waste claim to survive
a rule 23.1 motion.132
The ease with which some Delaware courts permit claims
of waste to proceed past the demand stage of derivative litigation is shown in the success rates of waste claims. A 2001 study
of 124 derivative claims challenging executive compensation
packages in both public and closely held corporations shows
that, including all stages of litigation,133 waste claims succeed
in Delaware at a similar rate to duty of loyalty and care

126. See Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *1
(Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (“[Waste is] an extreme test, very rarely satisfied by a
shareholder plaintiff . ”).
127. See, e.g., In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 137 (dismissing a claim of waste
that included allegations that the board repurchased stock at market value,
which the court construed, in and of itself, to indicate a rational decision).
128. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1054 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (dismissing the waste claim because the plaintiffs previously made
demand on the board).
129. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
130. See, e.g., White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 555 (Del. 2001).
131. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984), overruled on
other grounds, Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.
132. Cf. Reed & Neiderman, supra note 92, at 117.
133. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 583 (2001)
(“[W]e define success as defeating a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary
judgment, or prevailing at trial or on appeal.”).
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claims.134 This success rate is astonishingly high, considering
that it includes the postdemand stage portions of litigation
where it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs to succeed with
waste claims.135
This analysis indicates two findings. First, the waste
standard in Delaware corporate law is arguably a part of the
duty of good faith, which is not exculpable under a corporation’s
section 102(b)(7) clause. Second, some Delaware courts do not
require particularized factual allegations for a waste claim to
survive a rule 23.1 motion to dismiss for failure to make demand. Together, these two factors permit plaintiffs who bring
waste claims to both avoid exculpation clauses and survive the
demand stage of derivative litigation without alleging particularized factual allegations, thereby creating a means to effectively avoid the demand requirement.
III. RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENTS TO DELAWARE’S
APPROACH TO WASTE
This Note recommends that the Delaware courts explicitly
place waste under the duty of good faith. The Delaware courts
should also uniformly apply the particularized factual allegation requirement to ensure that only the most worthwhile
waste claims survive a rule 23.1 motion to dismiss for failure to
make demand.
A. WASTE BELONGS UNDER THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
Delaware courts should remove the current fog of ambiguity around the waste standard and explicitly state that waste is
a part of the duty of good faith.136 While there are substantial
public policy arguments against permitting courts to review the
134. The Thomas and Martin study of cases between 1912 and 2000, id. at
573, found that waste claims succeeded in twenty-nine percent of the Delaware cases, id. at 583, compared to twenty-seven percent for duty of care
claims, id. at 582, and thirty percent for duty of loyalty claims, id. at 585. Additionally, the study found that plaintiffs raised waste claims in more cases
(ninety-seven out of 124) than duty of care (twenty out of 124) or loyalty (eightytwo out of 124) claims. Id. at 583.
135. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. Ch.
1996) (describing the difficulty plaintiffs face when bringing a waste claim
at trial).
136. Some commentators argue that waste should fall under the duty of
care, rather than the duty of loyalty. E.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 84 –
90 (5th ed. 1998). See generally Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262–63 (finding that plaintiff ’s “substantive due care” claim was actually a waste claim).
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substantive decisions of directors, these concerns are misguided, as waste only applies to indefensible director decisions.
An explicit ruling that places waste under good faith would
provide a new mechanism for shareholders to hold directors accountable for their irrational business decisions. The economic
crisis that began in 2007 and the ensuing dramatic detrimental
impact upon shareholders137 demonstrate the need to make adjustments to the ways that directors manage corporations.138
By placing waste under the duty of good faith, waste would become a viable vehicle for shareholders to bring derivative suits
against directors, even if they are protected by section 102(b)(7)
exculpation clauses.139 This could have several important ramifications.
First, shareholders would be able to hold directors who
make irrational business decisions personally accountable for
the harm they cause to the corporation through those decisions.140 Waste is a stringent standard, so it would only be a viable claim for completely unreasonable decisions.141 Nonetheless, recent decisions of boards and their impact upon the
shareholders of corporations,142 as well as both the national
and world economies,143 indicate that a claim that addresses ir-

137. Cf. Dash & Creswell, supra note 1, at (describing the decline in Citigroup’s share price during the economic crisis).
138. There is an ongoing debate regarding whether the directors of Delaware corporations that sustained substantial losses in the financial crisis also
suffered significant personal financial harm, perhaps indicating that additional regulatory mechanisms are inappropriate. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk et
al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257 (2010) (finding that executives
at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers avoided substantial personal financial
losses during the crisis), with Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank
CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 1–2 (Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in
Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2010), available at http://www
.ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (finding that CEOs at corporations that experienced significant losses during the crisis also suffered substantial personal
financial harm).
139. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (stating that the
provision does not apply to “acts or omissions not in good faith”).
140. Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the
Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133,
1183 (1999) (arguing that the deference to decisions of directors under the
business judgment rule creates a “lack of accountability”).
141. See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
142. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 1.
143. Cf. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 112–
13 (Del. Ch. 2009) (describing some aspects of the economic downturn).
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rational decisions may be a necessary and viable mechanism of
accountability.
Second, the placement of waste under the duty of good
faith would provide a means to empower the shareholders of
Delaware corporations. If corporations’ exculpation clauses protect directors from claims of waste, shareholders will lose a
means to constrain the irrational decisions of board members.144 By placing waste under good faith, the Delaware courts
will permit shareholders to protect both their individual interests and the interests of the corporation against directors who
choose to make irrational decisions with significant detrimental
impacts.145
Third, an explicit statement by the Delaware courts that
waste falls under the duty of good faith may change the culture
of Delaware’s corporations.146 Directors who commit waste
would not be able to hide behind exculpation clauses.147 The
threat of personal liability may force directors to avoid irrational and indefensible decisions, while still permitting boards
discretion for the vast majority of their decisions.148 Such an
adjustment to board culture and decisions is warranted, as evidenced by the recent economic crisis.149

144. Cf. D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure,
and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 886 (2007) (arguing that,
outside the situation where discovery would harm the corporation, the business judgment rule and the deference granted to the decisions of boards by the
Delaware courts “impedes the adjudication of shareholder rights and interests” and “prevents shareholder actions from constraining boards”).
145. Cf. Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN.
L. REV. 95, 135 (2004) (arguing for a stronger waste standard to curb excessive
compensation packages).
146. See Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 518–22 (2009) (discussing the role of Delaware judicial decisions on directors internalizing new notions of the duty of loyalty).
147. See, e.g., In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 178–79
(Del. Ch. 2005).
148. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 444 (“Proponents of enhanced judicial scrutiny in good faith cases point to the incentive effects of a more stringent standard of review.”). Commentators also suggest that directors merely complying
with recent notions of loyalty may increase trust “among corporate directors,
their shareholders, and other interested parties.” Gold, supra note 146, at 509.
149. Cf. Dash & Creswell, supra note 1 (discussing decisions and a lack of
oversight that led Citigroup into financial difficulties). But see Desimone v.
Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 931–32 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[The] justified concern that
concepts of fiduciary duty not be used in an unprincipled and wholly-elastic
way to reach any and all behavior that, upon first blush, strikes judges as inappropriate.”).
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Fourth, the placement of waste under the duty of good
faith will serve to simplify Delaware’s system of fiduciary duties. The Delaware Supreme Court demonstrated an interest in
simplifying the fiduciary duty framework in Stone v. Ritter by
making good faith a part of the duty of loyalty.150 Removing
waste from its current procedural limbo and placing it under
good faith will further this simplification by creating only two
overarching fiduciary duties in Delaware corporate law: the duties of loyalty and care.151
Finally, placing waste under good faith will provide continuity to Delaware’s treatment of the waste doctrine.152 While
the Disney IV and Citigroup decisions provide some measure of
ambiguity regarding the placement of waste, they also serve as
precedent that waste may fall under good faith.153 Thus, waste
as a part of good faith would permit both courts and litigants to
predict the Delaware courts’ treatment of waste claims.154
A claim of waste permits Delaware courts to review the
substantive decisions of boards of directors, so placing it under
the duty of loyalty and making it a nonexculpable claim raises
serious public policy issues. First, Delaware statutory law
grants the authority to manage a corporation to its board of directors.155 Permitting courts to review the substantive decisions
of boards by making waste a nonexculpable claim arguably in150. See Velasco, supra note 37, at 1234.
151. See id. (“[M]any scholars and jurists have been seeking to return the
law of fiduciary duties to greater simplicity. One manifestation of this movement is rebifurcation.”). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 585–88 (2008) (discussing the difficulty of expanding the duty of loyalty to situations that do not
involve improper personal benefit).
152. Some authors caution, however, that the Delaware courts’ frequent
announcements of new fiduciary law detract from the continuity of Delaware
corporate law. See, e.g., William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery
of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 16–17.
153. See, e.g., Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The Delaware
Supreme Court has implicitly held that committing waste is an act of bad
faith.”). Some commentators note, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court
occasionally does not seem concerned with notions of stare decisis. See, e.g.,
Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000).
154. Cf. Romano, supra note 75, at 85 (noting the importance of clarifying
legal rules).
155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is
the offspring of the fundamental principle . . . that the business and affairs of
a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”), overruled on other grounds, Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
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terferes with this statutory mandate.156 Additionally, making
waste a viable claim against directors might cause director
candidates to refuse positions on boards to avoid the potential
for liability, thereby preventing corporations from gaining the
most talented candidates as directors.157
These concerns are not well-founded, as waste is a standard reserved for irrational director decisions.158 As such, waste
is a self-limiting doctrine that will only permit the courts to
find directors liable for the most egregious of business decisions.159 The placement of waste under the duty of good faith
will permit boards to freely manage their corporations, so long
as they avoid irrational and extreme decisions.160 Similarly,
qualified candidates will not be detracted from serving on the
boards of Delaware corporations, as the potential for personal
liability is minimized by the stringent nature of the waste
standard.161
Second, some might argue that judges lack the business
expertise to review the substantive decisions of boards,162
which would be permitted by making waste a viable claim

156. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 445 (“Limiting the availability of derivative
suits protects the board’s ability to manage the corporation.”). Some commentators and courts suggest that the waste standard should be eliminated entirely. E.g., William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1317–18
(2001); see also In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967
(Del. Ch. 1996) (“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the
fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending
through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’, provides no ground for director
liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”).
157. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 445 (noting that the risk of deterring competent directors from serving on boards is one justification for the protections
of the business judgment rule).
158. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (2006) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 263 (Del. 2000)) (describing the plaintiff’s burden in demonstrating waste).
159. See Lewis v. Austen, No. C.A. 12937, 1999 WL 378125, at *6 (Del.
Ch. 1999).
160. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 74 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263).
161. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. Ch.
1996) (describing waste as “theoretical”).
162. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical
Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 758 (2000). The initial articulation of
this argument is found in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., where the court declined to
impose its business judgment over that of the board. 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919).
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through its incorporation into the duty of good faith.163 Courts
also have the luxury of viewing all the ramifications of a business decision, while directors are limited to the information
available at the time of the decision.164 This may cause courts
to have hindsight bias and view the substantive decisions of
boards in a negatively skewed light due to the results of those
decisions, regardless of whether those results were foreseeable.165 Judges also are not accountable for their decisions, so
there are no repercussions if they render an inappropriate decision.166 Finally, these critics may support their argument that
judges are ill suited to review the substantive decisions of directors by noting the Delaware courts’ inconsistent treatment
of waste claims at the demand stage of derivative litigation.167
These arguments fail to acknowledge that Delaware judges
typically hold a high level of business expertise and experience.168 Delaware judges also have substantial incentives to
maintain their personal reputations and will be cautious in the
exercise of their review of the substantive decisions of directors.169 These traits ensure that judges will take caution to appropriately decide cases, giving the proper level of deference to
163. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (stating that the
protections of a board’s section 102(b)(7) clause do not extend to decisions
made in bad faith).
164. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The entrepreneur’s function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later
against a background of perfect knowledge.”). Courts also may not have as
much information about the corporation as the directors. Bainbridge, supra
note 27, at 119.
165. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523 (1998); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 100
(1991) (“Judges also are accustomed to deciding cases on full records and may
be too quick to blame managers who act—as often they should—in haste or on
incomplete information.”); Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 114 (“Given the vagaries of business . . . even carefully made choices . . . may turn out badly.”).
166. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 165, at 100 (“Judges are neither chosen for business acumen nor fired or subject to reductions in salary if
they err in assessing business situations.”).
167. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch.
1996) (noting that there is no logical terminus once courts begin to review the
substantive decisions of directors).
168. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 120 (“In contrast to judges in other
states[,] . . . Delaware chancellors frequently have considerable prior corporate
experience as practitioners.”); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589–90 (1990).
169. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 121.
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directors for their information shortfalls at the time of decisions.170 Any inconsistency in the handling of waste claims by
the Delaware courts is, therefore, not attributable to the qualifications or incentives of the judges, but the contradictory doctrines of making waste the theoretically most difficult standard
to prove, and yet easily permitting waste claims to survive the
demand stage of derivative litigation.171
Third, some may argue that Delaware courts should not
review the substantive decisions of boards through the waste
standard, as there are already market mechanisms that protect
shareholders and constrain directors.172 Today, institutional
investors function as active shareholders, removing collective
action issues present with a large number of small shareholders173 and providing a mechanism of control over directors.174
Additionally, directors have incentives to make appropriate decisions to maintain and improve their personal reputations.175
Finally, dissatisfied shareholders can simply vote out any offending board members.176 Thus, judicial review of the substan-

170. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts recognize
that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate
business decisions.”).
171. Compare Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 902 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (stating that waste claims frequently survive the demand stage of
derivative litigation with little factual support), with Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at
1051–52 (describing waste as “theoretical”).
172. See Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private
Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 303–06 (1988); cf. Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167, 181
(noting that directors of American corporations are monitored by market
mechanisms).
173. William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1089–90 (1999).
174. See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring:
The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 926 (1992) (“Institutions are
more likely than other shareholders to vote at all, more likely to vote against
manager proposals, and more likely to vote for proposals by other shareholders.”). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1292–93 (1991) (noting
that many institutional investors do not challenge the positions of directors).
175. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 122; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1832–35 (2001) (discussing the effects
of shaming sanctions on corporate managers).
176. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of
Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and
Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 451–
52 (2002).
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tive decisions of boards is arguably an unnecessary and “redundant” check on a board of directors.177
Despite these concerns, market mechanisms do not always
apply an adequate check to the discretion of directors.178 Even
during good economic times, directors may make irrationally
risky decisions.179 The potential for directors to make poor decisions is only exacerbated when corporations face a financial crisis.180 Under such circumstances, directors have incentives to
make risky decisions, perhaps even irrationally risky choices,
as directors have far less to lose if their decisions create financially devastating results for their corporation and its shareholders.181 The recent financial crisis is an example of how
market mechanisms failed to adequately check the unbridled
discretion of directors when their corporations faced difficult
situations.182 Thus, judicial review of the substantive decisions
of boards through the stringent waste standard is not redundant, but rather provides a necessary check upon the decisions
of directors.183
Similar to the market mechanism concern, critics of placing waste under the duty of good faith would argue that permitting courts to review the substantive decisions of boards
through the waste standard would stifle directors’ ability to
make beneficial risky decisions.184 According to these critics,
177. See Ronald J. Gibson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981).
178. Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1808
(2001) (finding that external market sanctions do not always serve as a viable
means to regulate director actions).
179. Cf. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism
of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 1001 (2003) (discussing
the lack of an adequate qualitative judicial response to the rise of executive
compensation packages).
180. A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate
Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2003).
181. See id.
182. Cf. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 113
(Del. Ch. 2009) (noting the subprime mortgage crisis).
183. Cf. Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and
Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1906 (1992) (arguing that shareholders
who wish to curb director compensation packages should “consider enlisting the
aid of the courts”). But see Blair & Stout, supra note 178, at 1808 (finding that
judicial sanctions are not always a successful method to curb director conduct).
184. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch.
1996) (describing risks associated with judicial “second-guessing” of directors’
substantive business decisions).
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risky decisions are desirable, as they hold the potential to yield
greater returns to the corporation and promote innovation.185
Additionally, shareholders of corporations have little incentive
to stifle risky decisions by directors, as they stand to benefit
greatly by such decisions,186 while under little risk of substantial losses or liability.187 Thus, the concern is that judicial oversight of the substantive decisions of directors will cause boards
to avoid beneficial risky decisions out of fear of personal liability.188
The beneficial risk concern is misguided in the context of
waste claims. Directors will not avoid beneficial risk due to the
threat imposed by waste, as the potential for personal liability
is mitigated by the difficulty for plaintiffs to establish a claim of
waste.189 The vast majority of directorial decisions are not irrational, as seen by the infrequency of successful waste claims.190
As such, there is little basis to argue that judicial review of director decisions through the waste standard will hinder directors’ propensity towards the assumption of beneficial risk.191
Delaware courts should place waste under the duty of good
faith, as this will provide a nonexculpable means for shareholders to hold directors personally liable for making irrational decisions, and potentially shift corporate culture away from indefensible decisionmaking. The concerns typically associated with
185. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. d (1994).
186. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 258–60 (8th ed. 2002).
187. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 111. See generally RONALD J.
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT 95–97 (1993) (stating that shareholders can limit their personal
risk by diversifying their portfolio).
188. See Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (“[D]irectors will tend to deviate from
this rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to
undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of derivative liability for any resulting corporate loss.”); Allen et al., supra note 176, at 450 (“By intruding on the
protected space that the business judgment rule accords such decisions, courts
create disincentives for businesses to engage in the risk-taking that is fundamental to a capitalist economy.”).
189. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating
that the current waste standard permits directors to assume “optimal rational
acceptance of risk”).
190. See, e.g., Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at
*5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (describing a successful claim of waste as the “rarest of all” claims).
191. See id. at *1 (stating that one reason for making the waste test difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy is to preserve the risk-taking incentive for directors).
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judicial review of substantive decisions of boards are inappropriate when dealing with waste, as this is a stringent standard
that will only police the most egregious director decisions. The
benefits of placing waste under good faith are severely limited,
however, if courts permit waste claims to easily survive rule
23.1 motions to dismiss for failure to make demand.
B. DELAWARE COURTS SHOULD UNIFORMLY EMPLOY A
HEIGHTENED FACTUAL REQUIREMENT FOR WASTE CLAIMS AT
THE DEMAND STAGE OF DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
While there are numerous benefits to permitting judicial
oversight of the substantive decisions of boards through the
waste standard, these are less persuasive if Delaware courts
allow waste claims to easily survive the demand stage of litigation. To preserve the managerial authority of boards and prevent needless litigation costs, the Delaware courts should uniformly apply the particularized factual allegation requirement
to waste claims when determining demand futility.
The current lack of uniformity in requiring plaintiffs to
plead particularized factual allegations for waste permits some
claims of waste to easily survive past the demand stage of litigation and reach expensive discovery.192 Requiring a low level
of factual specificity for waste claims under rule 23.1 motions
has the potential for numerous negative consequences. First,
Delaware corporations and shareholders will suffer. Discovery
has the potential to “disrupt normal corporate functions” and
potentially “force corporations to reveal their prospective business plans.”193 Additionally, derivative suits that reach discovery impose potential financial and reputation costs upon directors and their corporations.194 These costs are a significant
reason as to why directors are much more likely to settle derivative suits if they succeed in pleading demand futility.195 One of
the primary functions of the demand requirement is to eliminate dubious derivative suits, thereby permitting only worthwhile claims to impose these burdens upon directors and corporations.196
192. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 902 (Del.
Ch. 1999).
193. Gold, supra note 48, at 467.
194. See Telman, supra note 144, at 839.
195. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 531–32 (1991).
196. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1054 (Del. Ch.
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The current treatment of waste by the Delaware courts
does not protect directors and corporations from these strike
suits. Permitting waste claims to survive demand with minimal
factual allegations essentially removes the important demand
obstacle and imposes warrantless financial and reputation
costs upon directors and corporations.197 While viable claims of
waste are rare and do not provide an obstacle to corporations
finding the most qualified directors, these candidates may
avoid serving on boards if they frequently have to settle claims
of waste to avoid discovery.198 To preserve the demand requirement and protect directors and corporations from strike
suits, the Delaware courts should uniformly apply a particularized factual allegation requirement to waste claims brought by
plaintiffs who seek to avoid making demand on the board under
the second Aronson prong.
Second, permitting waste to easily survive demand allows
Delaware courts to limit the statutorily granted managerial authority conferred to directors under Delaware corporate law.199
If a plaintiff need only plead waste to survive demand, Delaware courts will be able to review all substantive decisions of
boards. While this substantive review is defensible if plaintiffs
provide particularized factual allegations in their claims of
waste, it becomes an impermissible restriction on the directors’
right to manage their corporation when plaintiffs may survive
to discovery with dubious claims.200 Thus, to limit the substantive review of director decisions to extreme cases, the Delaware
courts should uniformly apply a heightened factual pleading
requirement to waste claims.
Finally, the current Delaware treatment of waste claims at
the demand stage threatens to limit directors’ assumption of
1996); Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945,
952 (1993) (arguing in favor of the demand stage due to its particularized factual allegation requirement).
197. Permitting claims of waste to easily reach discovery also poses unnecessary costs upon the Delaware judiciary. Cf. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule
that Isn’t a Rule – the Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637–38
(2002) (describing one justification for the business judgment rule as the “conservation of the judicial resource”).
198. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 445 (noting that one justification for the
business judgment rule is the fear that directors will not serve on boards if
there is a high risk of personal liability).
199. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
200. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 445 (“Limiting the availability of derivative
suits protects the board’s ability to manage the corporation.”).
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risk. As viable waste claims are rare, directors only have to fear
liability for waste from irrational decisions.201 This balance is
lost if waste claims can easily survive the demand stage. To
avoid settling large numbers of waste claims, directors may
start to avoid the assumption of risk, which would serve to
harm both corporations and shareholders.202 To protect director
assumption of beneficial risk, Delaware courts should require
particularized factual allegations for waste claims, thereby only
permitting well-pled claims of waste to survive to discovery.
The benefits accrued from Delaware courts reviewing the
substantive decisions of boards through waste claims are limited if courts permit claims of waste to survive rule 23.1 motions to dismiss for failure to make demand with only minimal
factual pleadings. Courts should uniformly require particularized factual allegations for all claims of waste at the demand
stage of derivative litigation.
CONCLUSION
Waste is a stringent standard that is meant to hold directors personally liable for irrational business decisions. Despite
some indication from Delaware courts that waste is a part of
the duty of good faith and is, therefore, nonexculpable by a corporation’s section 102(b)(7) clause, the courts failed to explicitly
state the procedural placement of waste within Delaware’s fiduciary duty framework. In addition to this ambiguity, some
Delaware courts permit waste to survive the important demand
stage of derivative litigation with minimal factual allegations.
Delaware courts should explicitly hold that waste falls under the duty of good faith, and thus permit shareholders to hold
directors accountable for irrational business decisions and potentially create a corporate culture different from the one that
produced the recent economic crisis. However, the benefits of
permitting courts to review the substantive decisions of directors through the waste standard are lost if some courts permit
claims of waste to easily survive rule 23.1 motions to dismiss
for failure to make demand. Thus, Delaware courts should uniformly require that plaintiffs plead particularized factual allegations for claims of waste to succeed in demonstrating demand
futility.
201. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (2006) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)).
202. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).

